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FEDERAL VERSUS STATE JURISDICTION AND
LIMITATIONS VERSUS LACHES IN
SONGWRITER DISPUTES: THE SPLIT AMONG
THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS IN LET THE GOOD

TIMES ROLL, WHY DO FOOLS FALL IN LOVE?,
AND JOY TO THE WORLD
Don E. Tomlinson*
I. INTRODUCTION

For songwriter Shirley Goodman, the "good times rolled" (at least
judicially).' For songwriters Herman Santiago and Jimmy Merchant,
"fools" may be a more apt description.2 Likewise, Danny Jackson's
songwriting "world" contains little "joy.",3 For all these songwriters, the
pyrrhic good news was that they were (at least in effect) judicially
determined to have been co-writers of three famous rock 'n' roll songs. 4
The bad news, however, was that two of the songwriters received nothing,
and the third's recovery was substantially less than it possibly could have
been. 5 Notwithstanding any statutory limitations or equitable laches
defenses, the Fifth Circuit declared Shirley Goodman as co-writer of Let
Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication, Texas A&M University;
Adjunct
Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center; LL.M., University of Houston Law Center;
J.D., University of Arkansas at Little Rock; M.J., University of North Texas; B.S., Arkansas State
University.
1. See Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861
(1996).
2. See Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 52, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,519 U.S. 1108

(1996).
3. See Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 886, 889 (9th Cir. 1994).
4. See Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007,1014-15; Merchant, 92 F.3d at 56; Jackson v. Axton,
25 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1994).
5. Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007, 1015 (5th Cir. 1996) (awarding Goodman one-half of the
royalties, plus interest, that had been paid to the Lees since 1976); Merchant, 92 F.3d at 57
(holding plaintiff's claim was time barred as the three-year statute of limitations had run);
Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding plaintiffs claim, brought twenty-two
years after the song's release, was barred under the doctrine of laches).
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the Good Times Roll, and awarded her more than $600,000 in writing and
publishing royalties. 6 On the other hand, after being declared co-writers of
Why Do Fools FallIn Love? by the Second Circuit, 7 Herman Santiago and
Jimmy Merchant were disallowed any recovery on the theory that the
limitations provision of the Copyright Act 8 barred their damages claim. 9
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit prevented Danny Jackson, Jr., co-writer of Joy
to the World,'0 from recovering damages on the theory that the equitable
doctrine of laches was applicable as a complete defense."
The question then becomes, Why did three federal circuit courts reach
distinctly different results in such similar cases? The Supreme Court of the
United States denied certiorari in two of cases, 12 while it was not sought in
the other case. While it may be said that the Fifth Circuit hears
comparatively few music copyright cases,13 the same cannot be said for the
Second 14 and Ninth Circuits. 15 Whatever the basis for the split, it should be
reconciled.' 6 Music copyright cases involving famous songs do not occupy
a considerable portion of any federal court's docket, but the precedents set7
in these cases have a much wider application to all areas of copyright law. '
Generally, copyright disputes are not rare in the federal court system,' 8 and
surely they will grow in number and complexity in the Information Age.' 9
6. See Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007, 1015 (5th Cir. 1996).
7. Merchant, 92 F.3d at 52.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2000).
9. Merchant, 92 F.3d at 56-57.
10. Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1994).
11. Id. at 887.
12. Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861 (1996);
Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1108 (1996).
13. Although New Orleans, Louisiana, a hotbed of music, is included within the jurisdiction
of the Fifth Circuit, it has not been home to a significant number of music disputes in federal
court. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 1996).
14. The Second Circuit, especially regarding cases filed in the Southern District of New
York (Manhattan), has been home to many of the more significant music copyright decisions in
the nation's history. See, e.g., Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996).
15. At the close of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the
Ninth Circuit (especially in Southern and Northern California), decided many highly significant
copyright cases, e.g., the Napster decisions. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
16. See discussion of reconciliation infra Part V.
17. In addition to music, copyrightable matter includes computer software, all forms of
literature, television, motion pictures, and photography. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
18. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998); Quality
King Distrib., Inc., v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994); Feist Publ'ns v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
19. See Don E. Tomlinson, Journalism and Entertainment as Intellectual Property on the

2002]

FEDERAL V. STATE & LIMITATIONS V. LA CHES

Further, with the long history of fraud, non-payment, or underpayment of
royalties allegedly perpetrated against songwriters and recording artists
during the formative and early commercial years (and continuing to the
present time) of blues, 20 rhythm and blues, 2 and rock 'n' roll, 22 justice
Information Superhighway: The Challenge of the DigitalDomain, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 61
(1994).
20. Willie Dixon was a major blues songwriter and performer, having written such blues
classics as Back Door Man (covered by the Doors), Seventh Son (covered by Johnny Rivers), and
Little Red Rooster (covered by the Rolling Stones). James Bates, Businessman or Just Blues
Man? Dixon's Songs in Royalty Dispute, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at DI. He (and his estate
after his death) spent considerable time litigating to recover rights wrongfully held by others. Id.
Music royalty court fights have become increasingly common as artists and their
attorneys challenge details of contracts, some signed decades ago.... Such
disputes have been especially bitter for blues artists, many of whom maintain they
were shamelessly exploited by record executives when they were young. Indeed,
Dixon in 1979 founded the Blues Heaven Foundation, which helps blues artists
recover their royalties and rights.
Id.
In 1983, Washington, D.C. entertainment lawyer Howard Begle looked into the case of
Ruth Brown, a blues and R&B recording artist on Atlantic Records from the mid-fifties to the
early sixties. Bill Barol, One for the Soul Survivors: Righting Old Wrongs in the Music Business,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7, 1988, at 123. With recordings such as Teardrops From My Eyes, Brown
helped Atlantic achieve major-label status, but she was dropped from the label as it moved to cash
in on the rock 'n' roll craze. Id.
The label also stopped her royalty payments at that time. Id. Begle eventually looked into
the royalties questions of some thirty Atlantic acts, and "[w]hat he found was a mess. Royalty
accounts were maintained poorly, if at all." Id. Brown, flush with the success of her first royalty
check from Atlantic in twenty years, Begle, and a board of directors that included singer Bonnie
Raitt and music journalist Dave Marsh founded the Rhythm & Blues Foundation "as a way of
pressing the music industry to address some old inequities." Id. In 1988, Atlantic donated almost
$2 million to the foundation. Id.
21. By 1998, a titanic music royalties dispute had been traversing the federal court system
for eleven years, "with no end in sight." Richard Willing, Sour Notes Emerge from Motown's
Music, USA TODAY, June 11, 1998, at 12A. The lawsuit pits Motown's Berry Gordy, Jr., against
perhaps the most famous songwriting team in the history of soul and R&B: Eddie Holland,
Lamont Dozier, and Brian Holland, known in the songwriting world as H/D/H. Id. Their
songwriting hits include Baby Love, Heat Wave, and Where Did Our Love Go? Id. Among other
allegations, the lawsuit questions whether proper royalties were paid to H/D/H by Motown and
Motown's publishing arm, Jobete Music. Id. In the sixties, H/D/H conveyed their copyrights to
Jobete and Motown in return for royalties. Id.
Such arrangements carry a built-in formula for disagreement. A [successful] song
generates income in many ways: through recordings, live performances, movies,
videos, [sic] commercials. Companies that use a song send a fee to the song's
publisher. The publisher sends the songwriters their share. "The songwriter is at the
end of the process," Washington, D.C., entertainment lawyer Howard Begle says.
"There are any number of ways for (the songwriter) to get taken."
Id.
22. See Bems v. EMI Music Publ'g, Inc., 95 Civ. 8130 (CCH) 32,022 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
available at 95 Civ. 8130, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1999) (decision
concerning the famous rock 'n' roll songs Twist and Shout, Hang on Sloopy, and A Little Bit of
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demands a special look when such cases arise, notwithstanding that long
periods of time may have passed from the alleged initial transgression to
the filing of an action.2 3
For example, Chuck Berry, generally considered as the "father of rock
'n' roll,, 24 was sued in November 2000 by pianist and long-time Berry
sideman Johnnie Johnson, who alleged that he co-wrote more than fifty
songs with Berry in the 1950s and 1960s, including Roll Over Beethoven
and Sweet Little Sixteen, but never received proper credit or royalties.
According to Johnson, Berry "misled him into believing that only Berry
Soap, among others); see also Madara v. Singular Music Publ'g, Inc., No. 84-0006, 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3348, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1987) (decision concerning the famous rock 'n' roll
songs At the Hop and Rock and Roll Is Here to Stay).
In 1995, Beach Boys co-founder and lead singer Mike Love reached an out-of-court settlement
concerning thirty-five Beach Boys songs he was judicially declared to have co-written, but for
which he was never credited. Mike Love Settles Lawsuit Against Brian Wilsonfor $5 Million and
Future Royalties on 35 Beach Boys Songs, ENT. L. REP., Jan. 1995, at 8, 26 [hereinafter Mike
Love Settles Lawsuit]. There were allegations that in 1969, Murry Wilson, the father of Brian
Wilson (another co-founder of the group) transferred to Irving Music rights he did not own
(Love's, among others). Beach Boy Mike Love Sues Irving Music in California,ENT. LITIG. REP.,
Sept. 7, 1992, LEXIS, News Library, Entlit File. Love was to have received thirty percent of the
$10 million settlement Brian Wilson (the group's principal songwriter) received in his 1989
lawsuit against Irving Music. Mike Love Settles Lawsuit, supra. When he was not paid, Love
sued Brian Wilson in 1992. After a jury declared Love co-author and co-owner of thirty-five
Beach Boys songs, Love and Brian Wilson settled the dispute for $5 million in cash and future
royalties moving from Brian Wilson to Love. Id.
23. In 1995, Richard T. Morris filed suit in federal district court in California against
Motown, Berry Gordy, Jr., and others, claiming that from 1964 to 1971 he wrote and produced
some fifty songs for Motown but that he never received any credit or compensation as songwriter,
only as producer. Richard Morris Files Suit in CD CA Against Motown, Gordy & Others, ENT.
LITIG. REP., May 15, 1995, LEXIS, News Library, Entlit File.
Morris said he was delayed in filing [the] suit by the defendants' coercion and false
promises. He claimed the defendants seemed to acknowledge that he may be
entitled to royalties, and continually promised that they would investigate, and that
their agents and accountants would calculate, review and properly compensate
Morris at a future time for all royalties due and owing. He said defendants used
pressure and coercion to dissuade him from filing suit, claiming he would be
stripped of all credit and recognition, and would be blackballed from the music
business.
Id.
24. See David Segal, Chuck Berry, Not About To Roll Over, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2000. It
is not only the "Father of Rock 'n' Roll" who has been sued over the authorship and ownership of
hit songs, the "Godfather of Soul," James Brown, has also been sued-by his two daughters.
Singer James Brown Sued by Daughters, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 18, 2002), at
http://www.jsonline.com/enter/ music/ap/Sep02/ap-people-james-brO9I 802.asp. The suit, filed in
federal court in Atlanta, alleges that his daughters helped write the 1976 hit Get Up Offa That
Thing, as well as two dozen other James Brown recordings. Id. In a pre-suit letter to his
daughters' attorney, Brown's attorney agreed that about $66,000 was owed to his daughters, but
that Brown would be willing to pay them $198,000 if they would convey their copyright interests
in the songs to him. Id. The suit seeks more than $1 million. Id.
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was entitled to the copyrights. 25 In the suit, Johnson claimed that Berry
owed him one-half of the "tens of millions of dollars in royalties, license
fees and other payments" paid to Berry for the disputed songs.2 6 Johnson,
who was inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame's new "sideman"
category in 2001,27 alleged in the suit that "Berry wrote poems that he and
Johnson put to music" and that "Berry copyrighted the songs for himself
and later renewed the copyrights in his name or through Isalee [a music
publishing company belonging to Berry]. 28
In two counts of the seven-count complaint, Johnson sued for
copyright infringement. 29 Other counts sought a declaratory judgment of
co-ownership concerning the songs, an accounting of profits collected by
Berry in relation to the songs, a finding of a breach of fiduciary duty under
Missouri law and federal copyright law, and a finding of fraud based on
various alleged material misrepresentations. 30 In June 2001, after a hearing
on Berry's motion to dismiss each count as a matter of law, the court
dismissed the copyright infringement claims but allowed the suit to
continue on all the other claims. 3' Since Johnson was claiming to be the
co-author and, therefore, co-owner of the songs, the counts for
infringement could not lie because one co-owner cannot be liable to
another co-owner in the context of infringement.32 An infringement claim,
the court said, must be brought against a person or entity violating "the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner." 33 Thus, since an owner does not
have rights exclusive of a co-owner's rights, an infringement claim by one
co-owner against another is invalid as a cause of action.34
Berry argued that the remaining claims were time-barred, citing 17
U.S.C. § 507(b), the Copyright Act's three-year limitations period, and
Missouri's five-year statute of limitations applicable to the state law
claim. 35 Johnson argued that neither statute was applicable to the non-

25. Tony Gieske, Legal Briefs, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Dec. 8, 2000, at.78.
26. Id.
27. See Judge OKs Suit Against Chuck Berry, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 14, 2001), at
http://www.blues.com.nz/news/article?php.id=479.
28. Tim Bryant, Judge Dismisses Claim of Copyright Infringement in Lawsuit Against
Chuck Berry by His Longtime Pianist, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 16, 2001, at 29.
29. Johnson v. Berry, 171 F. Supp. 2d 985, 987-90 (E.D. Mo. 2001).
30. Id. at 988, 990-91.
31. Id. at 992.
32. Id. at 987 (citing Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1984)).
33. Id. at 987 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a)-(b)).
34. Id.
35. Johnson, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 988, 990.
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infringement counts for two reasons.3 6 The first reason asserted by Johnson
was that "Berry repeatedly led Mr. Johnson to believe that he was not
entitled to compensation for the Berry/Johnson Songs [sic] over and above
the fee he received as a musician during the various recording sessions. 37
The second reason concerned Johnson's allegation that Johnson was,
during any relevant time, incapacitated due to alcoholism.
Mr. Johnson experienced the onset of alcoholism in the late
1940's. For decades thereafter Mr. Johnson suffered the
physical, emotional and mental symptoms and consequences of
this disease which rendered him unable to comprehend the
ownership rights
magnitude of his musical contributions or 3the
8
to the music that he created with Mr. Berry.
After discussing several cases with conflicting results and "notuncomplicated principles, 39 the court debated whether the facts alleged by
Johnson, assuming their truth, could defeat or limit the limitations defense.
could not
The court ruled that an "appropriate application 'A of the facts
'
"be determined at this time, on the basis of the pleadings alone. -AI
Viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude at this juncture that plaintiff
will be unable to prove facts which might warrant a tolling or
estoppel with respect to the statute of limitations. Whether
plaintiffs alcoholism can constitute a disability tolling the
statute of limitations is an issue that requires the development of
a more detailed factual record and a more intensive legal
analysis than has been attempted by either party on the instant
motion [to dismiss]. The same is true of plaintiffs claims that
defendant Berry misled him concerning his rights to further
compensation for the music the two created.42
At the filing of the lawsuit by Johnson, one of Berry's attorneys said
the action would4 3be "'completely defended' and that there was no chance
of a settlement.

36. Id. at 988.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 988-89 (quoting complaint).
39. Id. at 989-90.
40. Id. at 990.
41. Johnson, 171 Supp. 2d at 990.
42. Id.
43. See Gieske, supra note 25, at 78. Apparently, Berry failed to argue that Johnson did not
co-write the songs with him. In fact, Berry may have directly or indirectly admitted in pleadings
and/or argument that he and Johnson co-wrote the songs. Among other evidence of these
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In October 2002, the court granted Berry's summary judgment
motion, denying Johnson's claims in their entirety." The principal ground
on which Berry sought summary judgment was the running of the threeyear statute of limitations under the Copyright Act.45 Johnson countered
that "his 'lack of legal mental competence' rendered him unable to
comprehend his cause of action.. . until 'shortly before' this action was
filed, '' 4 6 meaning that the cause of action had not accrued (and the
prescriptive period therefore had not begun to run) until less than three
years before the filing of the action.4 7
After reviewing the testimony of Johnson's clinical psychologist
expert witness, who stated that he did not believe "Johnson recognized that
there had been a wrong in terms of royalties or remuneration for his music,
nor did he have the cognitive capability of pursuing a remedy through the
legal system, 48 and after reviewing Johnson's deposition testimony
(observing, inter alia, that Johnson never had been treated for any
psychological disorder), the court noted that "during his 70+ years, Mr.
Johnson has lived independently and been generally competent to manage
his affairs unassisted. ''49 On the subject of Johnson's ability to pursue a
remedy through the legal system, the court said that "[a]wareness of injury
and awareness of a legal cause of action are two distinct things., 50 The
court cited the Second Circuit's opinion in Stone v. Williams51 to bolster its
conclusion:
We cannot adopt the proposition that to trigger the statute of
limitations not only must plaintiff know of the facts furnishing
her with a cause of action, but also that those facts are sufficient
to entitle her to relief.... The legal rights that stem from certain
facts or circumstances need not be known, only the facts or
possibilities is the court's seemingly factual acknowledgment that Berry and Johnson created
music together. See Johnson, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 988-89 (E.D. Mo. 2001). Also, the "laches"
concept may not have been argued by Berry; at least, it was not discussed by the court in its
ruling on Berry's motion to dismiss. See id.
44. Johnson v. Berry, No. 4:00CV1891-DJS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21090, at *25 (E.D.
Mo. Oct. 21, 2002). The final list of songs Johnson claimed to have co-written with Berry
included the classics Roll Over Beethoven, Rock and Roll Music, Sweet Little Sixteen, BrownEyed Handsome Man, Too Much Monkey Business, School Days, Reelin' and Rockin', Around
and Around, You Never Can Tell, and No ParticularPlace to Go. Id. at *2-*3.
45. Id. at *5.
46. Id. at *6.
47. See id
48. Id. at *6-*7 (quoting plaintiffs expert witness).
49. Id. at *7.
50. Johnson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21090, at *10.
51. 970 F.2d 1043 ((2d Cir. 1992).
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circumstances themselves.52
In the alternative, Johnson argued that even if the statute of
limitations were running, it was tolled by Berry's misconduct in misleading
Johnson and by Johnson's limited cognitive abilities.53 Based on deposition
testimony, the court ruled "as a matter of law that the evidence does not
support a conclusion that Mr. Berry actively misled [Johnson] as to his
legal claims. 54 The court also ruled that "as a matter of law, [Johnson's]
intellectual limitations do not constitute an extraordinary
circumstances of
55
the type required to support equitable tolling.,
As to Johnson's claim for an accounting, the court ruled that "[t]his
Court having determined that [Johnson's] claim of co-ownership of
copyright is barred as untimely, the derivative claim to an accounting of
profits as a co-owner is also barred., 56 The court also denied the remainder
of Johnson's claims as variously time-barred,57 stating that it "ha[d] here
given consideration to each of [Johnson's] arguments for relief from the
applicable statutes of limitations . ..[before finding] that no legal basis
exists to permit the litigation of these claims asserted so long after the
events from which they arise. 5 8
To make clear that the court's ruling had nothing to do with the
substance of Johnson's assertions, the court said that "[t]he disposition of
claims based on statute of limitations grounds is no reflection on the merits
52. Johnson, 2002 U.S. Dist. 21090, at *11- 12 (quoting Stone, 970 F.2d at 1049).
53. Id. at *12.
54. Id.at *13.
55. Id.at *16.
56. Id. at*18
57. Id. at *20. The court here noted a U.S. Supreme Court explanation of the underlying
policy regarding statutes of limitations:
On many prior occasions, we have emphasized the importance of the policies
under... statutes of limitations.
Statutes of limitations are not simply
technicalities. On the contrary, they have long been respected as fundamental to a
well-ordered judicial system. Making out the substantive elements of a claim for
relief involves a process of pleading, discovery, and trial. The process of discovery
and trial which results in the finding of ultimate facts for or against the plaintiff by
the judge or jury is obviously more reliable if the witness or testimony in question
in relatively fresh. Thus in the judgment of most legislatures and courts, there
comes a point at which the delay of a plaintiff in asserting a claim is sufficiently
likely either to impair the accuracy of the fact-finding process or to upset settled
expectations that a substantive claim will be barred without respect to whether it is
meritorious. By the same token, most courts and legislatures have recognized that
there are factual circumstances which justify an exception to these strong policies
of repose. For example, defendants may not, by tactics of evasion, prevent the
plaintiff from litigating the merits of a claim, even though on its face the claim is
time-barred. These exceptions to the statute of limitations are generally referred to
as "tolling" and.... are an integral part of a complete limitations policy.
Id.at *20-*21 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478,487-88 (1980)).
58. Johnson, 2002 U.S. Dist. 21090, at *22.
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of the claims, that is, on whether, if timely brought, Mr. Johnson would
have been entitled to relief from [Berry]. 59
After the court's ruling, one commentator, calling the case a "sad
htteothe outcome was "highly
chapter of rock & roll history,",60 wrote that
unsatisfying to anyone with an emotional hankering for the Ultimate
Truth., 61 Berry attorney Joe Jacobson said: "Let's say the copyright act
[sic] had no statute of limitations at all. We'd still win because I think we
could prove pretty persuasively that Johnnie Johnson was not a co-author
and really made very few contributions to the songs, other than his actual
performance. 62 Johnson attorney Mitch Margo countered: "If we'd have
gone to trial, we'd have won. I believe it from the depositions we took, the
mediation we had, ,,63 adding that he had favorable witnesses, but declining
to identify them in the event of an appeal. 64
Another Berry attorney, Martin Green, said after the court's ruling that
Berry harbored no ill feelings toward Johnson, saying that Berry "likes
[Johnson] very much, considers him a friend, and expects to play with him
in the future,65 And that "[h]e doesn't blame Johnnie for the lawsuit [but
rather] blames some of Johnnie's advisors. 6 6 Among the persons Berry
blames, Green said, are Keith Richards of the Rolling Stones and rock
legend Bo Diddly.67
While the situation is better today, recording artists and songwriters
remain vulnerable, 68 especially as concern grows over the ever-increasing
methods in which music is distributed. 69 The Supreme Court should grant
certiorari at its next opportunity to resolve the split in the circuits on these
questions and the questions raised in similar suits, such as Berry. Part I of
this Article discusses the issue of federal versus state jurisdiction in these

59.Id.
60. Rene Spencer Sailer, Chuckie and Johnny: Judge Tosses Out Lawsuit Between Rock
Legends, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at LEXIS, News & Business News, News, US
News, Combined.
61. Id
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Peter Shinkle, Chuck Berry Wins Suit, Blames Keith Richards, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, Oct. 23, 2002, at C2, available at LEXIS, News & Business, News, US News,
Combined.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Don E. Tomlinson, Everything That Glitters Is Not Gold: Songwriter-Music
PublisherAgreements and Disagreements, 18 HASTINGS CoMM, ENT. L.J. 85, 94 (1995).
69. See Don E. Tomlinson & Timothy Nielander, Unchained Melody: Music Licensing in
the DigitalAge, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 277, 284 (1997).
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cases, while Part III discusses how the limitations period as contained in
copyright law is applied inconsistently. Part IV discusses the applicability
of the doctrine of laches, Part V discusses the policies, which underlie
grants of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court, and Part VI offers
conclusions.
II. FEDERAL VERSUS STATE JURISDICTION
The issue of jurisdiction must be resolved before the limitations and
laches arguments can be heard in federal court.7 0 Goodman v. Lee,71
Merchant v. Levy,72 and Jackson v. Axton,73 were initially filed in federal
court. However, only in Goodman, did the defendants contest federal
jurisdiction,7 4 doing so on the basis that the dispute over joint authorship
and co-ownership of a copyright did not "arise under" federal copyright
law and therefore should not be heard in federal court. 75 Notwithstanding
that the issue did not appear in Merchant or Jackson, it is a split question

70. See Amy B. Cohen, "Arising Under" Jurisdiction and the Copyright Laws, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 337 (1992).
Although numerous courts of appeals and district courts have analyzed the
issue, the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed this question. Lower
courts determining the scope of copyright jurisdiction have thus relied on two
related lines of Supreme Court precedent: Cases arising under the patent laws for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1338; and cases arising under the laws of the United States
for purposes of the federal question jurisdiction provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Unfortunately, these precedents are so unclear that the question of when a case
arises under federal law has been described as "[t]he most difficult single problem
in determining whether federal question jurisdiction exists." The lower courts have
only exacerbated the problem by attempting to draw analogies from these
inconsistent precedents to govern copyright jurisdiction.
This issue has great practical and theoretical significance. Clear guidelines for
deciding whether to sue in state or federal court would be of substantial practical
value to a lawyer preparing to file a lawsuit. Litigants and society would benefit by
spending less time and money on the determination ofjurisdictional questions. This
issue also raises important theoretical questions of federalism and the appropriate
role of the federal courts in determining matters related to the copyright laws. The
time has come to consider this issue more thoroughly and to develop coherent
guidelines for deciding whether a claim arises under the copyright laws.
Id. at 339-41.
71. 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987).
72. 92 F.3d 51 (2d. Cir. 1996).
73. 25 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1994).
74. See Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1987).
75. See id. The leading case on the question of how to determine joint authorship is
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing joint authorship in the context of
various provisions of the Federal Copyright Act, leaving no question about its unstated view that
questions of joint authorship are indeed federal questions).
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that should be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
plan variety protection.., copyrights and trademarks.... Such
jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states patent,
plant variety protection and in ...copyright cases.76
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date
and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively
by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or
statutes of any state.77
...[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of
78
the same case or controversy ....
A "joint work" is a work prepared by two or more authors
into
with the intention that their contributions be merged
79
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.
According to the Federal Copyright Act, "[t]he authors of a joint work
are co-owners of copyright in the work.",80 The five federal statutory
provisions quoted above should make it clear that the federal courts have
exclusive and supplementary jurisdiction of disputes arising under the
copyright law, 8 1 that copyright law, in effect, no longer exists at the state
level, 82 and that creating copyright co-ownership is exclusively a matter of
federal law. 83 It would seem equally clear that federal courts are courts of

76. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 101. See Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive
Collaborator:Preservingthe Rights ofJointAuthors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193 (2001).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
81. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a), 1367.
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
83. Id. § 101.
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limited jurisdiction for federalism and other reasons,84 and therefore,
controversies not involving federal jurisdiction must be tried in state
court.
While these general principles seem clear, the devil is in the
details.8 6 The decisions concerning these issues are in some conflict with
one another, such as whether questions concerning the joint authorship of a
copyrighted work arise under federal copyright law or whether they should
be governed under state statutory, common-law, or equitable principles.87
It is clear that the mere invocation of the word "copyright" in an
action does not necessarily mean the action "arises under" copyright law.88
It is equally clear that, absent some other basis for federal jurisdiction, such
as diversity of citizenship, 9 an action concerning breach of a contractual
promise to pay royalties, 90 an action to foreclose a security interest in a
copyright, 91 and an action concerning the validity or effect of an
assignment belong in state court. 92 Several tests have been used to
determine whether supplemental federal jurisdiction exists. They include
determining the "primary and controlling purpose of the suit," the
"principal issue," the "fundamental
controversy," and the "gist or essence
93
of the plaintiffs claim.1

Once the federal court determines the principal issue, it must
94
determine whether the issue belongs in federal court or in state court.
Where, for example, the issue is whether the plaintiff is a joint author of

84. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919 v. Centermark Prop.
Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1994).
85. Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 874 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that 'subject
matter jurisdiction is not a matter of equity or of conscience or of efficiency,' but is a matter of
the 'lack ofjudicial power to decide a controversy."') (emphasis added).
86. RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT 455 (6th ed. 1995).
"Allocating jurisdiction in disputes over copyright ownership has proved particularly
troublesome." Id. at 456.
87. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1996); Dead Kennedys v.
Biafra, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Lieberman v. Estate of Paddy Chayefsky,
535 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
88. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964). On this issue, Judge
Friendly wrote: "Mindful of the hazards of formulation in this treacherous area, we think that an
action 'arises under' the Copyright Act if and only if the complaint... asserts a claim requiring
construction of the Act .. " Id. at 828.
89. 28.U.S.C. § 1332.
90. See Golden West Melodies, Inc. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 79 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1969).
91. See Republic Pictures Corp. v. Sec. First Nat'l Bank of Los Angeles, 197 F.2d 769 (9th
Cir. 1952).
92. See Rotardier v. Entm't Co. Music Group, 518 F. Supp. 919, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
93. See Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983).
94. Id. at 994.
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copyrightable matter and therefore a co-owner with the defendant of a
copyright, the court must indicate whether questions of joint authorship and
co-ownership arise under federal copyright law or under state law.95 The
Ninth and Fifth
Circuits apparently disagree with the Second Circuit's
96
interpretation.

In Lieberman v. Estate of Paddy Chayefsky,9 7 the Second Circuit
thought the proposition elementary:
The plaintiff, Jeffrey Lieberman, alleges that he coauthored
"Altered States" with the defendant and that the work is
therefore a joint work within the meaning of [the Copyright
Act]. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment to this effect.., and
an accounting based on the entitlement of a joint author to an
undivided one-half interest which is provided by [the Copyright
Act]. [The Copyright Act] provides that copyright "vests
initially in the author or authors of the work" and that "[t]he
authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the
work .... " Thus, the claimed right upon which plaintiff bases
his claim arises directly from the statute. [The Copyright Act]
defines "joint work" as "a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole...."
Resolution of the central issue in this case depends upon
the
98
application and interpretation of this statutory definition.
The Ninth Circuit decided this issue in apparent opposition to the Second
Circuit's view of the situation. 99 In Dead Kennedys v. Biafra,'00 three
former members of the defunct musical group filed suit in state court
against Jello Biafra, the fourth member, alleging seven state law causes of
action. 10 1 All four former members of the group were equal partners in a
still-existing partnership. 0 2 The three former band members and the
partnership filed the suit. 10 3 Biafra removed the case to federal court on the

basis that two of the state law causes of action contained claims arising
95. See, e.g., DeadKennedys, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1153; Lieberman, 535 F. Supp. at 91.
96. Compare DeadKennedys, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1153, and Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007
(5th Cir. 1996), with Lieberman, 535 F. Supp. at 91.
97. Lieberman, 535 F. Supp. at 90.
98. Id. at 91; see also Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007, 1013 (5th Cir. 1996) (illustrating that
the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit on the issue of federal question jurisdiction).
99. See Dead Kennedys, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1151.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 1152.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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exclusively under the federal Copyright Act, both of which claims
concerned the rights to underlying musical compositions as between
himself and the plaintiffs. 10 4 Additionally, Biafra counterclaimed with ten
causes of action, one of which sought a declaratory judgment that he was
an author, with rights in the underlying musical compositions, not assigned
free to exploit.' 0 5 In
or licensed by him to the plaintiffs, and which he was
10 6
spite of these assertions, the Ninth Circuit remanded.
In Goodman v. Lee, 10 7 the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court
determination that federal jurisdiction was inappropriate because an action
to establish title did not arise under the federal copyright law, 0 8 the district
court having cited a line of cases decided in the Southern District of New
York.' 0 9 The Fifth Circuit, however, distinguished that line of cases, as
"cases concern[ing] ownership disputes arising from contractual
agreements between the parties."" 0 The court reasoned: "[this] case clearly
involves the application and interpretation of the copyright ownership
provisions of [the Copyright Act]. Therefore, federal jurisdiction over this
case was proper, and the district court erred in dismissing Goodman's
cause of action.""'
III. COPYRIGHT ACT LIMITATIONS
Similar to the jurisdiction question, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
interpreted the possible meanings of the limitations period expressed in the
Copyright Act. 112 Nonetheless, the concept of limitations has played a
significant role in many copyright-based disputes at the circuit-court
level. 13 In Jackson v. Axton,' 14 any application of the statute of limitations
was eschewed" 5 in favor of the application of the laches doctrine,

104. Id.
105. DeadKennedys, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
106. Id. at 1154. "An action for an accounting or determination of ownership as between
alleged co-owners is founded in state law and does not arise under the copyright laws. These
rules apply whether co-ownership arises from joint authorship or through co-ownership of rights
through a partnership." Id. at 1153.
107. 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987).
108. Id. at 1032.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1031-32.
112. Lyons P'ship, L.P., v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001).
113. See id. at 799.'
114. 25 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1994).
115. Id. at 887-88.
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discussed infra.ll6 In Merchant v. Levy,'" 7 the statute of limitations acted
as a complete bar to recovery," 18 and in Goodman v. Lee," 9 the statute of
limitations acted as a partial bar to recovery. 2 0
The limitations period can be a significant restriction upon the right to
recover damages in a copyright action.121 Under Section 507(b) of the
Copyright Act, the period of limitations for civil proceedings is three
years. 22 While it may seem that limitations questions should be
of challenges concerning the
straightforward, courts face a number
23
application of the limitations provision. 1
When does the clock begin to run?
" Is the limitations period tolled until the plaintiff knows or
reasonably should have known of the accrual of a cause of action?
* How is the limitations period calculated? For example, does the
limitations period begin to run anew each time the copyrighted
matter is performed and rights under the Copyright Act are
thereby implicated?
These questions have been discussed in numerous cases; not
surprisingly, there is a split among the circuits. 124 In Hotaling v. Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-DaySaints, the Fourth Circuit adopted the prevailing
view that the limitations period of three years bars actions brought more
than three years after the claim accrues. 25 It also adopted the notions that
"[a] cause of action for copyright infringement accrues when one has
knowledge of a violation or is chargeable with such knowledge,"' 26 that "a
"

116. See infra Part IV.
117. 92 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996).
118. Id. at 57.
119. 78 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 1996).
120. Id. at 1013-15. In what definitely has not been a "sea of love," there have been
multiple unsuccessful lawsuits filed over the authorship and ownership rights to the classic rock
song Sea OfLove. See Statute of Limitations Bars Suit by Songwriter Philip Baptiste to Rescind
1959 Publishing Contractfor Sea of Love, ENT. L. REP., Aug. 2002, at 17. In this suit, Philip
Baptiste has alleged that he is the sole writer of the song. Id. In the most recent action, filed in
state court in Louisiana against the song's publisher, Baptiste sought rescission of the original
publishing agreement, alleging fraud in its making. Id. Based on the defendant's limitations
argument, the trial court dismissed the action and that ruling has been affirmed by the Louisiana
Court of Appeal. Id.; see also Baptiste v. Shuler, 809 So. 2d 1210, 1216 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
121. Merchant, 92 F.3d at 57.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2000).
123. See, e.g., Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 202
(4th Cir. 1997); Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1117-19 (7th Cir. 1983).
124. CompareHotaling, 118 F.3d at 202, with Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1117-19.
125. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 202 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 507(b)).
126. Id. (quoting Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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party does not waive the right to sue for infringements that accrue within
three years of filing by not asserting related claims that accrued beyond
three years,"' 127 and that, "under the prevailing view, a party cannot reach
back, based on acts of infringement that accrued within the limitations
period, and recover for claims that accrued outside the limitations
period."128 The court acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Taylor v. Meirick129was contrary to the prevailing view.

In Taylor, the defendant copied the plaintiffs copyrighted maps, but
the plaintiff failed to file suit until four years later, because the alleged acts
of infringement were hidden from him.' 30 Nonetheless, the defendant
argued that the suit was time-barred.' 3' The court disagreed.
The court based its reasoning, first, on the fact that the defendant had
taken no action to recover the infringing maps from the dealers to whom he
had sold them. The court reasoned that, "[a] tortfeasor has a duty to assist
his victim. The initial injury creates a duty of aid and the breach of the
duty is an independent tort....1 This
principle applies to a statutory tort
32
such as copyright infringement."
In addition, in discussing the effect of fraudulent concealment on the
tolling of the limitations period, the court further reasoned:
Often, whether or not the defendant has done anything to
conceal from the plaintiff the existence of the cause of action,
the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff learned or by
reasonable diligence could have learned that he had a cause of
action.... [I]t should be enough to toll the statute of limitations
that a reasonable man would not have discovered the
infringement.... [W]here... there

had

been

no

active

concealment by the tortfeasor[,] the injured party would have
had no reason to suspect that he was 33the victim of a tort, [so]
there may be no duty of inquiry at all.'
Moreover, on the question of whether the plaintiff could recover for
infringing sales that took place more than three years before he sued, the
court said, "[t]he statute of limitations does not begin to run on a
continuing wrong till the wrong is over and done with.' 34
127. Id. (quoting Hoey v.Dexel Systems Corp., 716 F.Supp. 222, 223 (E.D.Va. 1989)).
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Taylor v.Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983)).
130. Taylor, 712 F.2d at1117-18.
131. Id. at 1117.
132. Id. (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 322, cmt.c (1965)).
133. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1117-18.
134. Id.at 1118.
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The principle strikes a balance between the plaintiffs interest in
being spared having to bring successive suits, and the two
distinct interests ... that statutes of limitations serve.

One is

evidentiary-to reduce the error rate in legal proceedings by
barring litigation over claims relating to the distant past. The
other is repose-to give people the assurance that after a fixed
time they can go about their business without fear of having
their liberty or property taken through the legal
process.... When the final act of an unlawful course of conduct
occurs within the statutory period, these purposes are adequately
served, in balance with the plaintiffs interest in not having to
bring successive suits, by requiring the plaintiff to sue within the
statutory period but letting him reach back 35and get damages for
the entire duration of the alleged violation. 1
In Stone v. Williams, 136 the Second Circuit followed the prevailing
view, that a plaintiff can recover for acts of infringement dating beyond the
37
limitation period on the application of the continuous wrong doctrine.
However, the court ruled that the "continuous wrong doctrine" did not bar
defendants from arguing the three-year limitations period. In effect, any
suit Stone filed would allow her to recover only prospectively and for the
three-year period prior to the filing of the suit.' 38
The holder of a copyright has a property interest which, when
invaded by an infringer, may be vindicated by an infringement
action. Each act of infringement is a distinct harm giving rise to
an independent claim for relief. This does not mean that when
infringements occur during the limitations period recovery may
be had for past infringements. Recovery is allowed only for
those acts occurring within three years of suit, and is disallowed
for earlier infringing acts. Application of the continuous wrong
doctrine generally has been rejected in the infringement
context.... [S]tatutes of limitations bar remedies, not the
assertion of rights. This principle applies to the Copyright Act.
Thus, Stone's suit is timely insofar as relief is sought for
defendants' failure to remit to her a proportionate share of
135. Id. at 1119.
136. 970 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1992).

137. Id. at 1049-57. There the court reasoned that "[a]n overtly technical approach to
copyright entitlements has not carried the day in other contexts, and it fails to do so in this one."
Id. at 1050.
138. Id. at 1051 (recognizing an extension of the three-year period in order to determine if,
in fact, Stone was the daughter of country music legend, Hank Williams, Sr.).
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1 39
royalties received within three years of suit.
Applying the Copyright Act in Goodman, the Fifth Circuit determined
that Goodman was a co-owner of the song. However, the court then held
to all remaining issues,
Louisiana law, instead of federal law, applicable
140
including the appropriate limitations period.
Under Louisiana law, an action by a co-owner for an
accounting is governed by a ten-year prescriptive period (statute
of limitations), which "d[oes] not begin to run until demand is

made ... for an accounting."

As Goodman first demanded her

share of the income derived from "Let the Good Times Roll" in
1984, her action, filed in 1985, was timely.
In challenging this conclusion, the Lees argue that the threeyear statute of limitations set forth in the Copyright Act governs
this action. They assert that Goodman's claims accrued more
than three years before she filed her complaint, and that the
action is accordingly time-barred. They argue in the alternative
that, at a minimum, Goodman's recovery should be limited to
the period beginning no earlier than three years before the action
was brought, i.e., relating back no further than 1982. Neither
argument can prevail.
Section 507(b) of the Copyright Act provides that "[n]o civil
action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title
unless it is commenced within three years after the claim
accrued." But this case does not present an action that is
"maintained under the provisions" of the Copyright Act. The
Act details at length precisely which civil actions and remedies
are available for copyright infringements. Nowhere in the Act,
however, do its provisions detail any action available to a coowner for an accounting. Instead, as discussed above, such an
action is governed by state law. Consequently, even though the
case requires an interpretation of the Copyright Act's definition
of a joint work-thereby compelling the assumption of federal
jurisdiction-the action is not being maintained under the
provisions of the Copyright Act: There are no provisions in the
Act establishing or governing such an action. Accordingly, we
of
reject the Lees' contention that the three-year statute
141
claim.
Goodman's
governs
507(b)
§
in
out
set
limitations
139. Id. at 1049-51.
140. Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007, 1012-14 (5th Cir. 1996).
141. Id. at 1013. On this issue in Johnson v. Berry, the court stated:
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In Merchant v. Levy, 142 the statute of limitations argument proved
dispositive. On this issue, the court said the following:
Plaintiffs filed the instant suit in 1987, primarily seeking a
declaration of their copyright ownership rights and an
accounting of profits. Civil actions under the Copyright Act are
subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Defendants argue
that since Plaintiffs did not institute suit for a declaration of
copyright co-ownership within three years of the accrual of their
claim, they are now time-barred.
...The jury found that Plaintiffs were charged with
knowledge of their claim as of 1961, the year they attained the
age of majority. Thus, Plaintiffs' claim accrued in 1961, but they
did not initiate suit until 26 years later. Though Plaintiffs
contend on appeal that the statute was tolled, the basis for such
tolling, duress, did not arise until 1969, ending in 1984. By
1969, however, the three-year statute of limitations had long
since expired.
The District Court nevertheless awarded Plaintiffs a
declaration of co-ownership rights and damages for a time
period beginning three years before the commencement of their
suit.
...A co-author knows that he or she jointly created a work
from the moment of its creation.... We hold that plaintiffs
claiming to be co-authors are time-barred three years after
accrual of their claim from seeking a declaration of copyright
co-ownership rights and any remedies that would flow from
such a declaration. Our conclusion promotes the principles of
repose integral to a properly functioning copyright market.
Plaintiffs' suit is therefore barred by the statute of
143
limitations ....

In Goodman, the Fifth Circuit held that a copyright co-owner's claim for an accounting
was subject to a state statute of limitations because an accounting remedy is not
expressly provided for in the Copyright Act. If not wrongly decided, Goodman
invaded a claim of co-ownership which had been vindicated by a jury's verdict and
which itself found to have been timely asserted. By contrast, in this case, [Johnson's]
claim for co-ownership has been found to be untimely asserted, and has not been
determined on the merits in his favor.
Johnson v. Berry, No. 4:00CV1891-DJS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21090 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 21,
2002), at *16-*17.
142. 92 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996).
143. Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 56, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1996).
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In Jackson v. Axton,' 44 the district court did not reach the statute of
limitations defense asserted by Axton because the court granted summary
judgment based on laches. 145 The Ninth Circuit did little more than
mention that a statute of limitations argument had been offered in the lower
court, affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment on a laches
basis. 146
IV.LACHES

The concept of laches played a significant role in Goodman v. Lee,
Merchant v. Levy, and Jackson v. Axton. 147 Laches, an equitable defense, is
reflected in the maxim "vigilantibus non dormientibus aeuquitas subvenit
(equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights)., 148 The
essence of the defense is not just a delay for a particular length of time like
the statute of limitations; rather, the defense requires proof that the delay
1 49
was both unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendant.
Even if an applicable statute of limitations has not yet run, a court
50
may deny equitable relief if the delay in filing suit was unreasonable.
However, plaintiffs still may avail themselves of legal remedies. 5' For
example, a plaintiff who is denied specific performance because of laches
152
may still seek contract damages.
The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy,
which require for the peace of society the discouragement of
stale demands. And where the difficulty of doing entire justice
by reason of the death of the principal witness or witnesses, or
from the original transactions having become obscured by time,
is attributable to gross negligence or deliberate delay, a court of
equity will not aid a party whose application is thus destitute of

144. 814 F. Supp. 42 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
145. Id. at 44.
146. Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 887-90 (9th Cir. 1994).
147. See generally Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing the
applicability of the doctrine of laches); Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (also
discussing the applicability of the doctrine of laches); Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884 (9th Cir.
1994) (discussing the applicability of the doctrine of laches).
148. Stone v. Williams, 873 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1989).
149. Id. ("In contrast to a statute of limitations that provides a time bar within which suit
must be instituted, laches asks whether the plaintiff in asserting her rights was guilty of
unreasonable delay that prejudiced the defendants.").

150. Id. at 624.
151. See id. at 626.
152. See id.
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153
conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' 54 laches is an affirmative
defense. The burden of proving laches lies with the defendant.155 It is an
equitable doctrine that depends upon the facts of each case, unlike the
statute of limitations, which is its legal equivalent. 56 Laches offers the
courts more flexibility by favoring rules concerning proof of unreasonable
delay 57and prejudice to the defendant and by disfavoring mechanical

rules.

The laches defense turns on the question of inequity rather than the
mere passage of time. 58 The Supreme Court also has stated that,
concerning laches, "no arbitrary or fixed period of time has been, or will
be, established as an inflexible rule.' 59
In the context of laches, the following circumstances may excuse the
plaintiff s delay:
160
* Concealment, fraud, or inequitable conduct by defendant;
*

Reasonable lack of awareness of the facts giving rise to
relief; 16 1 or

162
* Lack of funds with which to hire an attorney.
In Goodman v. Lee, the Fifth Circuit was
dismissive of the Lees'
63
claim that laches should bar Goodman's claim.1

153. Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U.S. 556, 566 (1890).
154. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(c).
155. Id.
Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment,
release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
156. See Tomas G. Robinson, Laches in FederalSubstantive Law: Relation to Statutes of
Limitation, 56 B.U. L. REv. 970, 987-88 (1976).
157. See Gruca v. United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 1252, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1974).
158. Stone v. Williams, 873 F.2d 620, 625 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating "Prejudice may
also ... be found if, during the period of delay, the circumstances or relationships between the
parties have changed so that it would be unfair to let the suit go forward.").
159. The Key City, 81 U.S. 653,660 (1 Wall. 1871).
160. See generally A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1033
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding presumption of laches in patent infringement action may be eliminated
by offering evidence to show excuse for patentee's delay in bringing action or that delay was
reasonable).
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007, 1014 (5th Cir. 1996).
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This argument is without merit: The Louisiana Supreme Court
has specifically stated that the common law doctrine of laches
does not apply to actions maintained under Louisiana law.
Moreover, even if we were to assume arguendo that a federal
common law doctrine of laches applies to Goodman's action, the
Lees' argument would still fail ....

In the instant case, the Lees

cannot establish that the delay by Goodman in filing her action
was inexcusable. The jury specifically found that Goodman "did
not know or should not have known that Leonard Lee listed
himself as sole author on the copyright register for 'Let The
Good Times Roll' until 1984.".. . Accordingly, even if we were
to apply a federal laches doctrine, it would not bar Goodman's
claim6 64
In Merchant v. Levy,165 the Second Circuit agreed with the district
court's determination that "equity's 'clean hands' principle," given the
facts of the case, prevented the defendants (or at least some66of them) from
profiting from their "untoward actions" by asserting laches. 1
In Jackson v. Axton, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[w]hether laches
may be a defense to an action seeking a declaration of co-authorship of a
copyrightable work... is a question of law ... [and] is therefore subject to

de novo review."' 67 Indicating application of the doctrine of laches was, in
this context, a question of first impression for the Ninth Circuit, the court
held that "laches may be a defense to an action seeking a declaration of coauthorship (and resulting co-ownership) of a copyrightable work. Claims of
ownership are traditionally subject to the defense of laches.' ' 168 On the
question of whether laches was inapplicable in the sense that the dispute
involved a continuous wrong that would toll even laches, the court said,
"[t]he disputed events regarding authorship of the Song took place long ago
and cannot take place again in the future.' ' 169 The court held that Jackson
knew of the cause of action by 1975, perhaps as early as 1971, and that "the
presumption of prejudice resulting from" the delay in filing the suit had
"not been rebutted" by Jackson.' 70 The court held that Axton (and his
successor-in-interest to the copyright) was "actually prejudiced by

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
92 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id. at 54, 56.
Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 887-88.
Id. at 888.
Id. at 889.
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' 71
Jackson's delay" [and] Jackson's counter-arguments [were] unavailing.'
The court,172 therefore affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment.

V. RECONCILIATION
Every year, thousands of civil litigants, having lost a lawsuit or at
least some issues in a lawsuit in a lower court, file a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.' 73 Of these petitioners,
only about five percent are granted a full review by the nation's highest
17 4
court.
Among the various bases for the granting of certiorari
by the
1 75
Court is the need to resolve a split among the circuit courts.
Inconsistency in the circuit courts lies at the heart of Supreme Court
review of disputes that, by themselves, would not involve sufficient
significance to attract a grant of certiorari. 176 The problem with
inconsistency among the circuits is that litigation is encouraged, 177 causing
difficulty in planning on a national level, since the same law means
something different depending upon the circuit.' 78 Splits can be difficult for
79
businesses and individuals operating in two or more federal circuits.'
Forum shopping is encouraged, 80 and circuit splits betray the fact that at
8
least two groups of judges conclusorily differ on a point or points of law.' '
A conflict among the circuits, then, may be as important a reason as any for
82
the granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court. 1
It cannot be argued too strongly that the Court does not have room on
its docket to grant certiorari to 'resolve splits among the circuits. Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, speaking at a law-school symposium on the
future of the federal courts in 1996, said:
It is the federal district courts and the courts of appeals that
171. Id.
172. Id. at 890.
173. Kevin H. Smith, Justice ForAll?: The Supreme Court's Denial Of Pro Se Petitionsfor
Certiorari,63 ALB. L. REv. 381, 381-83 (1999).
174. Id. at 382-83.
175. See Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth
Circuit,and the Congress,77 OR. L. REV. 405, 431 (1988).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See Herald, supra note 175, at 431.
182. See id. at 431, 489 (reasoning that inconsistency can create public perception that laws
are irrational and unfair, and splits carry "accompanying baggage of inconsistency in the law.").
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are being hit hardest by this ever-increasing wave of litigation.
The Supreme Court's docket is actually down from what it was
several years ago. With the district courts, it is largely a question
of having enough judicial manpower to adjudicate the incoming
cases. The same is true to a large extent of the courts of
appeals ....
,183
In the context of the splits in the cases that are the subject of this
Article, resolution is necessary so that the law will be nationally uniform
and to prevent forum shopping. Forum shopping can easily occur in
copyright cases because venue might properly lie in every federal district in
the country in which a song had been performed, and that easily could
mean every district. 8 4 Settlement negotiations, at every stage of litigation,
are affected by arguments over whether the law of one circuit as opposed to
another will become the law in a third circuit should the issue be litigated
there.' 8 5 The uncertainty affects whether a lawyer will take a case on a
contingent-fee basis and may thus be determinative of whether a putative
plaintiff is able to bring suit at all. 186 Contingent-fee arrangements may be
especially important for songwriters
with few funds and aging but
87
claims.1
legitimate
substantively
Certiorari is granted in copyright cases to cure splits from time to
time, such as in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 188 where the Court "granted
certiorari... to address an important area of federal law and to resolve the
conflict between the Ninth Circuit's 'dual' standard for awarding attorney's
fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505, and the so-called 'evenhanded' approach
exemplified by the Third Circuit."' 8 9 Actually, the split was between more
than the Third and Ninth Circuits. 90 The Second, Seventh, and District of
Columbia Circuits agreed with the view of the Ninth Circuit, and the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits agreed with the Third Circuit's view.' 9' The

183. William H. Rehnquist, "The Future of the Federal Courts," 46 AM. U. L. REV. 263,
270 (1996).
184. See Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright
Court: Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantages, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 717, 719-23
(1999).
185. See Stephen Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 14, 39-40 (1992).
186. See John Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1595, 1617 (1993).
187. See id.at 1595-96.
188. 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
189. Id. at 521.
190. Id. at 521 n.8.
191. Id. at 521-22.
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Supreme Court ultimately sided with the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh
Circuits and reversed and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit.192 In a
case involving trade secrets and federal patent law, 193 the Court granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict in the circuit courts where four circuits held
one way and only one held in the opposite direction.' 94 The Court sided
with the four-circuit majority. 195
VI. CONCLUSION

The mishmash of rulings in these three cases and the others discussed
in this Article provide considerable evidence that reconciliation is
Disputes over copyright co-authorship and co-ownership
warranted.
deserve better legal analysis and conclusions of law than they have been
96
shown by the circuit courts-the Second, Fifth, and Ninth in particular.'
Shirley Goodman (presumably) received substantial damages (and income
derived from post-ownership-declaration royalties). Jimmy Merchant,
Herman Santiago, and Danny Jackson, Jr., all received nothing. 197 This is
not to argue that Goodman should not have recovered and that Merchant,
Santiago, and Jackson should have recovered; rather, it is to say that the
gaps in how these cases were adjudicated are far too wide.

192. Id. at 535.
193. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,470 (1974).
194. Id. at 472.
195. Id. at 493.
196. See Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1996); Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d
884 (9th Cir. 1994); Merchant, 92 F.3d at 51.
197. Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1994); Merchant,92 F.3d at 56.

